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Abstract 
This paper examines the case where a citizen faces a sequence of bureaucrats in a transaction 
approval process. Each bureaucrat has the authority to disapprove an application and all of the 
bureaucrats must approve an application for it to be accepted. Each bureaucrat also has the ability to 
request a facilitating payment during the review process. Models are developed to explain bureaucrat 
behavior when there are no sanctions present to moderate the requests for facilitating payments, and 
where another government official with the authority to impose penalties on corrupt behavior is 
included in the process. Model I demonstrated that there is no economically rational reason for a 
bureaucrat to forgo requesting a facilitating payment. Model II showed that relatively low sanction 
multipliers are required to induce a bureaucrat to forgo the opportunity to request a bribe if the 
bureaucrat is in the early steps in a multi-step approval process. The predictions made by Model II 
were then tested using students as surrogates for bureaucrats. The results indicate that wide 
dissemination of information about sanctions that have been imposed could have a preventive or at 
least moderating effect on bribe behavior by public sector employees.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of “secret shoppers” in combating petty corruption in a multi-step, 
multi-bureaucrat setting. Petty corruption is extortion performed by low-level bureaucrats against 
citizens when they request (require) facilitating payments to provide needed approvals that they control 
as part of their job function. Facilitating payments had the lowest joint probability of detection and 
punishment of the five types of illegal acts included in a case-based study of corruption in the public 
sector in Bolivia conducted by Murphy (2004). Facilitating payments are the payments extorted from 
the public in cases of petty corruption.  
Studies have shown that petty corruption is costly for both firms and households in developing 
countries (Clarke, 2011). Fisman and Svensson (2007) reported that both tax rates and bribery were 
negatively correlated with firm growth in a developing country. Their results indicate that corruption 
retards firm growth to a greater extent than does taxation. 
Klitgaard (1998) identified government monopoly, discretion in interpreting law or procedures, and a 
lack of direct accountability as the conditions that, when present, give minor government officials the 
ability to extort facilitating payments or petty bribes. González, Lopez-Córdova and Valladares (2007) 
showed that corruption appears to be more common in countries with excessive regulation and where 
democracy is weak. Kaufmann (2010, p. 88) noted that “Excessive regulations not only do not address 
the more fundamental causes of corruption, but often create further opportunities for bribery”. It would 
thus appear that a highly bureaucratic environment, one where government has monopoly control over 
many transactions, would create a fertile environment for corruption. 
A government monopoly exists whenever a government requires that specific types of transactions be 
registered or approved. For example, requiring a building permit to build or modify structures gives a 
government monopoly control over construction. The existence of information asymmetry or the right 
to interpret laws, regulations or procedures to either facilitate or impede the timely processing of a 
transaction gives minor government officials the ability to impede transaction approval and registration 
processes, or to facilitate such approvals when an appropriate facilitating payment is made. Officials 
often request facilitating payments (bribes), which are common in developing countries, in exchange 
for performing their normal job functions efficiently and potentially in the citizen’s favor. There is little 
control over the actions of a government functionary dealing with a citizen and so little control over the 
requests for or payment of facilitating payments. This is where the role of a “secret shopper” comes 
into play. 
A secret shopper is a government official with the authority to sanction other government functionaries 
who, in the conduct of a transaction with the secret shopper, request or demand a facilitating payment. 
The objectives of undercover operations which make use of secret shoppers to combat petty corruption 
are to (1) reduce the harm imposed on citizens by corrupt government functionaries, (2) reduce the 
perception that corruption is pervasive and hence transform the culture a governmental entity where a 
culture of corruption has evolved, and (3) combat corruption with minimal cost. The use of secret 
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shoppers in an undercover operation reduces that probability of the use of entrapment as a defense 
should the undercover operations result in legal action.  
 
2. Formal Models 
Murphy and Yetmar (2016) examined the case where a citizen faced a single bureaucrat who had the 
power to approve or disapprove a project or transaction and the ability to request a facilitating payment 
or bribe for the approval of the submitted application. In this paper, we extend our previous analysis to 
encompass the case where the citizen faces a sequence of N bureaucrats where N  2. Each of the 
bureaucrats has the authority to disapprove an application and all of the bureaucrats must approve an 
application for it to be accepted.  
A citizen, C, has engaged in a transaction which must be approved and registered with the appropriate 
governmental agency. The approved and registered transaction has a value V to the citizen. The citizen 
has decided to prepare the necessary application form with a preparation cost (A) that is proportional to 
the value of the transaction such that A = aV, where a ≤ 1. In addition, when the application is 
submitted, the citizen must pay a mandated application fee (P) which is also proportional to the value 
of the transaction such that P = cV where c ≤ 1. 
The application specifies the conditions that must be met for a transaction to be approved and 
registered. The degree to which an application meets the legal requirements is specified by Q, and if q 
= 1 then the application meets all of the legal requirements, otherwise q = 0. Thus an application either 
meets or does not meet the requirements for registration. The bureaucrats who control the approval 
process have private knowledge about the interpretation of relevant law, regulations and procedures 
and so may approve an application even when q = 0 if an appropriate bribe is paid. 
In the first model we look at the simple case where a citizen faces a sequence of bureaucrats in the 
approval process. In the second model we expand that case to include the possibility that the citizen is 
in fact a government official charged with reducing corrupt behavior and whose real identity is not 
known to the bureaucrats. In the second case the bureaucrats are faced with a risk-assessment problem 
and with a risk that will affect the expected value of their actions. 
2.1 Model I 
In this model bureaucrats may each request a facilitating payment or bribe (bn) where bn  0 for the nth 
bureaucrat in the sequence. Bureaucrat n in the approval sequence does not know the amounts of the 
individual bribes that have been requested at the earlier steps in the approval process and which may 
already have been paid, or the total amount of the bribes previous paid by the citizen for the application 
currently under review. However, bureaucrat n knows that all requested bribes, if any, have been paid 
in the case were q ≠ 1. Were it not so, the application would have been rejected at the point where a 
requested bribe was not paid. If q = 1, then an application may have been approved at the prior steps 
with a delay (D) without the payment of a bribe. Consequently, bureaucrat n is uncertain about the 
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willingness of C to pay bribes. The cost of approval delay to C at each step in the process is given by D 
= dnV, where 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 at step n in the approval process. 
The sequence events in this process are as follows: 
Step 1: C engages in a transaction which must be recorded, 
Step 2:  C prepares the necessary application form with a cost of A = aV, 
Step 3:  C submits the transaction for approval and pays the mandated transaction 
processing fee P = cV, 
Repeat Steps 4 through 6 for each Bn for n = 1 to N 
Step 4:  Bn decides whether or not transaction approval criteria have been met and 
demands a non-negative bribe bn ≥ 0 and Bn estimates the probability that C will 
pay a facilitating payment if one is requested, denoted as en, where 0 ≤ en ≤ 1. 
Step 5: C decides whether to pay the bribe to Bn (pn = 1) or forgo the bribe (pn = 0), 
and 
Step 6: If C paid the bribe to Bn, then the transaction is approved at step n in the 
approval process and (tn = 1) whether or not q = 1. If C did not pay the bribe 
(pn = 0), then the transaction is approved at step n with a probability of tn = q < 
1 and C incurs the delay cost at step n of Dn. 
Step 7: If all N bureaucrats have approved the application, then the application is 
approved and registered. This occurs when 
ܰ ൌ	∑ ݐ௡ே௡ୀଵ           (1) 
The expected value of the project to C is given by the following: 
If pn = 1 for at least one n then EVC1 = V – [ aV + cV + ∑ ܾ௡ே௡ୀଵ  + ∑ ݀௡ܸே௡ୀଵ ]  (2) 
If pn = 0 for all n then EVC2 = V – [ aV + cV + ∑ ݀௡ܸே௡ୀଵ ]     (3) 
In equation (2) C has the ability to pay a bribe and avoid the delay cost, or if q=1, refuse to pay a 
requested bribe and absorb the delay cost. This is a rational decision when bn > dnV. Setting equation (2) 
equal to equation (3) and solving for b, we find that C would be indifferent between paying and not 
paying bribes only if ∑ ܾ௡ே௡ୀଵ = 0, a rather intuitive conclusion. On the other hand, if C decides to pay 
all requested bribes, then the delay cost is eliminated as in equation (4) 
If pn = 1 for all n then EVC1 = V – [ aV + cV + ∑ ܾ௡ே௡ୀଵ  ]     (4) 
   Now setting equation (4), the all-bribe case equal to equation (3), the no-bribe case we find 
that C would be indifferent between paying a bribe or absorbing the delay cost only when they are 
equal. That is, when  
∑ ܾ௡ே௡ୀଵ  = ∑ ݀௡ே௡ୀଵ .           (5) 
A rational C would select the lower of the cost of a bribe or the cost of delay. The expected value to a 
bureaucrat of accepting a bribe, ignoring legitimate compensation, is simply  
EVBn = en (bn)             (6) 
 Where  
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en = probability that a requested bribe will be paid 
bn = bribe amount requested by bureaucrat n  
Given that en  0 and bn > 0 there is no incentive or reason for B not to request a bribe. There is no 
penalty for requesting a bribe and if VBn = 0 then B is no worse off than he or she would have been had 
no bribe been requested. 
2.2 Model II 
In this section, we extend the simple and intuitive model presented in Model I and introduce the 
possibility that any given C is really a government official (G) with the power to impose sanctions on 
Bn. The sanction or fine (F) is assumed to be a function of the bribe requested such that f = mbn, where 
m > 1. That is, the monetary cost of the sanction, whether it be a fine or job termination, is greater than 
the amount of the requested bribe. It is presumed, that when G issues a sanction F, the knowledge is 
public and so all other bureaucrats are aware of G’s identity and processing of the application ceases.  
Each bureaucrat must now assess the possibility that C will pay a requested bribe, and also that if a 
bribe is requested it will be made to a G rather than a C. If the bribe is requested of a G then there is a 
further probability that the G will forego the sanction to progress further up the application 
authorization chain and “catch larger fish”. However, a foregone sanction is the same as no sanction, so 
the two actions are combined into a single act. As noted above, the probability that C will pay a 
facilitating payment if one is requested, denoted as en, where 0 ≤ en ≤ 1.  
To simplify the analysis, we assume that every B has made the same subjective risk assessment (R) that 
a C is really a G and that the subjective risk assessment applies equally in every step of the process. 
Thus, the first G in a sequence expects with probability r that the C is really a G. The second G in the 
sequence now has a joint probability assessment or (r)(r) = r2 that the C is a G. In general, the 
subjective probability assessment by the nth B that a C is really a G is given by rn. Consequently, the 
subjective risk assessment that a C is a G as made by a B decreases the further down the application 
review and approval process an application moves. In essence, this captures the idea that if no one 
before me was caught, then I probably will not be caught either. 
Now the expected cost of being sanctioned for corrupt behavior is given by 
 Fn = rn(m)bn             (7) 
The expected values for the actions of bribing and not bribing are given in equations (8) and (9). If Bn 
requested a bribe then: 
 EVBn = (1 - rn)(en)(bn) – rn(m)bn          (8) 
And if Bn did not request a bribe then: 
 EVBn = (1 - rn)(en)0 = 0           (9) 
Setting equation (8) equal to equation (9) and solving for m we find that: 
 ݉ ൌ	 ௘ሺଵି௥೙ሻ௥೙               (10) 
This value of m, the sanction multiplier, is the point at which Bn would be indifferent between not 
requesting a bribe and requesting a bribe with the risk of being sanctioned. The value of rn in the 
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denominator decreases exponentially as n increases. In addition, the term (1-rn) in the numerator 
approaches 1 as n increases. Consequently, as rn approaches 0, m begins to grow exponentially. Table 1 
below shows the computed values of m assuming that B’s subjective assessment of e is 50 percent, that 
citizens will pay bribes 70 percent of the time, and that B’s subjective assessment of r, the risk at a C is 
a G who will sanction the bureaucrat is just 10 percent.  
 
Table 1. Values of m Given e = .7 and r = .1 
n m
1 6.3
2 69.3
3 699.3
4 6,999.3
5 69,999.3
6 699,999.3
7 6,999,999.3
8 69,999,999.3
9 699,999,999.3
10 6,999,999,999.3
 
3. Experimental Assessment 
Our mathematical model suggests that bribe behavior could be moderated by the probability and size of 
a penalty and by the information or experience that a bureaucrat may have about the penalties imposed 
on those who request bribes. These propositions were assessed in an experimental setting using a 2x2 
factorial design where the position of the bureaucrat in the approval process and that individual’s 
knowledge about the imposition of penalties were manipulated. The factorial design is summarized in 
Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Experimental Design 
 Knowledge of Sanctions 
Position in Processing Que 
 
No Knowledge 
NO 
Prior Knowledge 
YES 
First Case 1 Case 2 
Last Case 3 Case 4 
 
The null form hypotheses to be tested in this design are: 
H1: The position of a bureaucrat in the approval process will not affect the likelihood that a 
bribe will be requested. 
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H2: The position of a bureaucrat in the approval process will not affect the amount of a 
requested bribe. 
H3: The knowledge that a bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions will not affect the 
likelihood that a bribe will be requested. 
H4: The knowledge that a bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions will not affect the 
amount of a requested bribe. 
These hypotheses were tested in an experimental setting using students as surrogates for a government 
bureaucrat. The four cases were randomized to reduce the probability of hypothesis guessing by the 
experimental subjects. 
The subjects were told that the average proposal processed by the bureaucrat’s department had a 
project budget of $30 million and that the average proposal submission fee was $5,000. In addition, the 
subjects were told that the bureaucrat’s monthly salary was $1,500. In addition, the subjects were told 
that the National Audit Office, in an attempt to reduce public sector corruption, had implemented a 
“secret shopper” program and that secret shoppers had the authority and discretion to impose a fine or 
other sanction if a bribe was requested, or to pay a bribe and continue through the approval process and 
possibly receive a larger bribe request.  
The subjects were also informed that the bureaucrat was the first (last) individual in the approval 
process, and that the bureaucrat had never been fined or sanctioned by a secret shopper and did not 
know of anyone else who had been sanctioned, or that although the bureaucrat had never been fined or 
sanctioned by a secret shopper, the individual did know of others who had been sanctioned. 
3.1 Students as Surrogates 
Previous research leads to the conclusion that students are adequate surrogates for accounting 
practitioners in decision-making experiments (Liyanarachchi, 2007). Studies that have focused on 
decision-making, such as this study, have reported similarities between students and professionals 
(Ashton & Kramer, 1980; Houghton & Hronsky, 1993; and Liyanarachchi & Milne, 2005). The 
accounting literature suggests that an ability to make judgments consistent with professional standards 
is an important quality of audit decisions (Bedard, 1991). Such knowledge and ability is gained through 
formal accounting education as well as through modeling the behavior of more experienced 
professionals in the work place. The students used in this study were highly educated; they were 
upper-division accounting majors and graduate students. In addition, the use of advanced-level 
accounting students as surrogates for accounting practitioners is supported in relatively structured 
decision contexts (Mortenson, Fisher, & Wines, 2012). Therefore, we concluded that the students that 
were used are adequate surrogates for the purposes of this study. 
3.2 Subjects 
The subjects were 62 students enrolled in accounting classes at a large, public university. Subject 
demographic measures are summarized in Table 3 below. Most of the subjects had at least one year of 
full-time work experience with an experience range in years from zero to thirty-seven. Years of 
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full-time work experience was the only potential covariate that was significantly correlated with bribe 
likelihood (Pearson Correlation = -0.169, two-tailed significance = 0.008). Subjects with more full-time 
work experience made lower bribe likelihood assessments. In addition, both bribe amount and the 
subject’s confidence in her or his bribe assessment were positively correlated with bribe likelihood 
(Pearson Correlation = 0.329, two-tailed significance = 0.000, and Pearson Correlation = 0.245, 
two-tailed significance = 0.000 respectively). None of the other potential covariates were significantly 
correlated with the independent variables, bribe likelihood and bribe amount. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Tables 4 and 5 summarize bribe likelihood and bribe about by the experimental treatments, the position 
of a bureaucrat in the approval process (Position) and the bureaucrat’s knowledge that a bureaucrat has 
about the history of bribe sanctions (Knowledge).  
 
Table 3. Subject Demographics 
 Total Percent 
n   62 100% 
Current degree program 
   Undergraduate 
   Master of Accountancy 
 
  54 
    8 
 
87.1 
12.9 
Undergraduate Major 
   Accounting 
   Finance 
   Management 
   Non-business 
 
  53 
    3 
    4 
    2 
   
85.5 
4.8 
6.5 
3.2 
Average full-time work experience 
    Mean Years 
    Standard Deviation 
    
    3.355 
   (6.558) 
 
Average part-time work experience 
    Mean Years 
    Standard Deviation 
 
   3.581 
  (2.612) 
 
Work Experience Field 
   Financial services 
   Manufacturing 
   Public accounting 
   Retail 
   Services 
   Wholesale/Distribution 
 
    8 
    3 
    6 
  19 
  25 
    1 
 
12.9 
4.8 
9.7 
30.6 
40.3 
1.6 
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Age 
    Mean Years 
    Standard Deviation 
   
  25.1 
   (7.815) 
 
Gender 
   Female 
   Male 
 
  20 
  42 
 
32.3 
67.7 
Career Objective 
   Public accounting 
   Corporate accounting 
   Governmental accounting 
   Non-accounting 
 
  24 
  23 
    7 
    8 
 
       38.7 
37.1 
11.3 
12.9 
Developing Country Experience 
   Yes 
   No 
   
  16 
  46 
  
25.8 
74.2 
 
Table 4. Mean Bribe Likelihood (Standard Deviation) 
 Knowledge of Sanctions Total 
Position in 
Processing Que 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
First 2.98 
(0.914) 
1.92 
(0.874) 
 
2.45 
(1.079) 
Last 3.50 
(1.198) 
2.05 
(1.015) 
 
2.77 
(1.324) 
Total 
 
3.24 
(1.091) 
1.98 
(0.946) 
 
 
Table 5. Mean Bribe Amount (Standard Deviation) 
 Knowledge of Sanctions Total 
Position in 
Processing Que 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
First $3,795.16 
(3,854.715) 
$1,913.71 
(2,284.484) 
 
$2,854.44 
(3,293.891) 
Last $8,476.61 $3,896.77 $6,189.69 
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(8,804.636) (3,809.973) 
 
(7,139.594) 
Total 
 
$6,135.89 
(7.165.070) 
$2,905.24 
(3,283.030) 
 
 
As is evident in Table 5 the mean bribe amount increases when the bureaucrat’s position in the 
approval process changes from first to last in line. The mean bribe amount decreased from $6,136 when 
the bureaucrat had no prior knowledge of individuals being sanctioned to $2,905 when they had such 
knowledge. The implications of this are discussed in the conclusion section. 
A t-test of bribe likelihood based on position resulted in a t value of -26.939 (2-tailed significance = 
0.000). The same t-test based on knowledge resulted in a t value of -21.849 (2-tailed significance = 
0.000). T-tests of bribe amounts based on position and knowledge resulted in t values of -12.289 
(2-tailed significance = 0.000) and -12.288 (2-tailed significance = 0.000) respectively. The mean 
values of both bribe likelihood and bribe amount for the two experimental treatments (position and 
knowledge) are statistically different.  
ANOVA was used to test H1 and H3. The dependent variable in the test of these two hypotheses was 
bribe likelihood, and the independent variables were the position of a bureaucrat in the approval 
process (H1) and the knowledge that a bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions (H3). The two 
covariates that were significantly correlated with the dependent variable, years of full-time work 
experience and subject’s self-assessed confidence in bribe likelihood, were included in the model. The 
results of the ANOVA of bribe likelihood are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. ANOVA of Bribe Likelihood 
R2 = 0.371 
Adjusted R2 = 0.358 
 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean Square 
 
F 
 
Sig 
Corrected Model 131.785 5 26.357 28.596 .000 
Intercept 116.272 1 116.272 126.149 .000 
Full-time Work 
Experience 
12.554 1 12.554 13.621 .000 
Assessment Confidence 14.790 1 14.790 16.047 .000 
Position 4.009 1 4.009 4.350 .038 
Knowledge 91.449 1 91.449 99.217 .000 
Position * Knowledge 2.189 1 2.189 2.374 .125 
Error 223.054 242 .922   
Total 2048.000 248    
Corrected Total 354.839 247    
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As shown in Table 6 both the position of a bureaucrat in the approval process and the knowledge that a 
bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions had a significant effect on the likelihood that a bribe 
will be requested. Thus the null hypotheses that (H1) the position of a bureaucrat in the approval 
process will not affect the likelihood that a bribe will be requested, and (H3) the knowledge that a 
bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions will not affect the likelihood that a bribe will be 
requested are rejected. The combined effect of position and knowledge was not significantly significant. 
However, the covariates, years of full-time work experience and decision assessment confidence were 
statistically significant. It appears that subjects with more years of work experience assessed the 
likelihood of a bribe as being lower, possibly because that had not seen or experienced that behavior in 
their careers. 
ANOVA was also used to test H2 and H4. The dependent variable in the test of these two hypotheses 
was bribe amount, and the independent variables were the position of a bureaucrat in the approval 
process (H2) and the knowledge that a bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions (H4). The two 
covariates used in the test of H2 and H4 that were not significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable were excluded from this analysis (Note). The results of the ANOVA of bribe likelihood are 
shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. ANOVA of Bribe Amount 
R2 = 0.175 
Adjusted R2 = 0.161 
 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean Square 
 
F 
 
Sig 
Corrected Model 1448402782 3 482800927.4 17.225 .000 
Intercept 5068004879 1 5068004879 180.814 .000 
Position 688444516.1 1 688444516.1 24.562 .000 
Knowledge 647098225.8 1 647098225.8 23.087 .000 
Position * Knowledge 112860040.3 1 112860040.3 4.027 .046 
Error 6839027339 244 28028800.57   
Total 1.336E+10 248    
Corrected Total 8287430121 247    
 
As shown in Table 7, both the position of a bureaucrat in the approval process and the knowledge that a 
bureaucrat has about the history of bribe sanctions had a significant effect on the amount of a requested 
bribe. Thus the null hypotheses that (H2) the position of a bureaucrat in the approval process will not 
affect the amount of a bribe will be requested, and (H4) the knowledge that a bureaucrat has about the 
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history of bribe sanctions will not affect the bribe amount are rejected. The combined effect of position 
and knowledge was significantly significant at 0.05.  
3.4 Discussion 
Table 4 indicated that subjects in the last step of an approval process would be more likely to request a 
bribe than they would in the first stage of the proposal review process. For example, the overall 
likelihood of requesting a bribe increased by 11.6 percent when the position of the bureaucrat changed 
from first to last in the review and approval process. In addition regardless of the position of the 
subjects in the review and approval process the probability of requesting a bribe was higher in the cases 
where the subject did not have prior knowledge about the imposition of sanctions. When the subjects 
had prior knowledge about sanctions the overall likelihood of requesting a bribe decreased by 38.9 
percent. It appears, just from Table 4, that individuals are more likely to request a bribe in the later 
stages of the review and approval process. Perhaps they believe that a citizen who has made it almost 
through the approval process has much to gain and little to lose by paying the last bribe. It also appears 
that knowledge about prior sanctions is at least a moderate deterrent to bribe behavior. For individuals 
in the first step of the approval process the likelihood of requesting a bribe decreased by 35.6 percent 
when they had prior knowledge about bribe sanctions. For those in the last step of the process, the 
probability of requesting a bribe decreased by 41.4 percent. The percentage changes in bribe likelihood 
were large within treatment groups. For example, the mean likelihood of requesting a bribe decreased 
by 35.7 percent when experimental subjects were in the first step in the process and knowledge 
changed from no prior knowledge to prior knowledge. However, when the subjects were in the last 
stage of the process and knowledge changed from no knowledge to knowledge the likelihood of 
requesting a bribe decreased by 41.4 percent. 
Similar changes are seen in bribe amount in Table 5. The mean bribe amount increased from $2,854.44 
to $6,186.69, a percentage increase of 116.7 percent when the position of the subjects in the process 
changed from first to last. The mean bribe amount decreased from $6,135.00 to $2,905.24, a decrease 
of 52.7 percent when knowledge changed from no prior knowledge about sanctions to knowledge of 
prior sanctions. These changes again indicate that bribe amounts are higher when experimental subjects 
were at the final stage of the approval process. Both the subject (surrogate for a bureaucrat) and the 
citizen knew that the process was at the final stage and that the citizen had as higher incentive to pay a 
bribe and exit with the proposed project approved. However, knowledge of prior sanctions again 
affected the requested bribe amount. Requested bribe amount decreased by 50.4 percent for subjects in 
the first position in the process when they had prior knowledge of sanctions, and by 46.0 percent when 
the subjects were in the final stage of the process. 
 
 
 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/rem               Research in Economics and Management               Vol. 4, No. 1, 2019 
81 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
Model I demonstrates that, in the absence of sanctions, there is no economically rational reason for a 
bureaucrat to forgo the opportunity to request a facilitating payment (i.e., a bribe). Model I also 
illustrates that citizens will pay requested bribes as long as the total cost of all bribes is less than the 
total delay cost. In such a situation there is an incentive for bureaucrats to make the delay cost as high 
as possible to incentivize bribe payment. Delay costs can be increased by increasing the processing 
time for transactions or, for example, by misplacing the citizen’s application. 
Citizen expected values were not changed in Model II however this model did introduce a risk 
parameter for the bureaucrats. Model II shows that relatively low sanction multipliers (m) are required 
to induce a bureaucrat to forgo the opportunity to request a bribe if the bureaucrat is in the early steps 
in a multi-step approval process. However, the required size of the sanction multiplier increases rapidly 
the farther along a bureaucrat is in the approval process. This occurs because the perceived joint 
probability of being sanctioned decreases at each step in the multi-step approval process.  
This suggests that in practice, bureaucrats in the early steps of a multi-step approval process should be 
the targets of enforcement activities. When individuals in the early steps of an approval process are 
punished for corrupt behavior a signal is sent to all of the actors in the approval process that is likely to 
change their risk assessment and, consequently, their behavior. 
The experimental test of the model also indicated that there was a larger decrease in bribe likelihood 
for subjects in the last stage of the approval process when knowledge about sanctions was manipulated. 
However, the percent decrease in bribe amount was slightly higher for those in the first state of the 
process when knowledge was manipulated. This change is consistent with what was projected by the 
model. 
4.1 Implications for Practice 
In Table 6, the ANOVA analysis of bribe likelihood and Table 7, the ANOVA analysis of bribe amount, 
both treatment variables, position in the approval process and knowledge about sanctions, were 
statistically significant. The position of a bureaucrat in an approval process may be difficult to change, 
especially if the individual has position-specific expertise or knowledge that is critical in the approval 
process. Nevertheless, officials charged with the responsibility to monitor and reduce the levels of 
corruption in the public sector can use this knowledge to more closely monitor the activities of 
bureaucrats in the later stages of approval processes.  
It is evident, at least in this experimental setting, that both the likelihood of requesting a bribe and the 
amount of the requested bribe were informed by subject’s knowledge of prior sanctions imposed on 
bureaucrats caught requesting bribes. It thus appears that the wide dissemination of information about 
sanctions that have been imposed could have a preventive or at least moderating effect on bribe 
behavior by public sector employees. 
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4.2 Future Research 
This analysis is based on the assumption that individuals are economically rational and that their 
behavior will be consistent with the predictions made by the models. This study only addressed the 
position of a bureaucrat in the approval process and prior knowledge about sanction imposition on 
bribe behavior (likelihood and amount). This study did not address the model’s assertion that larger 
sanction multipliers are required to induce indifference in the latter steps of the multi-step approval 
process. Future research should address the effect of different sanction multipliers both in single stage 
approval processes and multi-stage processes.  
This research addressed the issue of bribe behavior from the point of view of the bureaucrat who is in a 
position to request a bribe. Future research should address the behavior of the other party in the process, 
that is, the citizen. Future research might address citizen sensitivity to bribes both in terms of amounts 
and timing in a multi-step approval process. In addition, future research should address the effect of the 
existence and size of whistleblower rewards on the bribe-related behavior of both parties in the 
approval process. For example, a model could be developed and tested to determine the point at which 
a citizen is indifferent between paying a bribe for transaction approval, and becoming a whistleblower 
and receiving a whistleblower reward at the risk of having the transaction rejected, although knowing 
that the transaction could be resubmitted possibly to another bureaucrat. 
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Note 
An initial ANOVA was run for bribe amount with the inclusion of the two covariates from Table 5. 
The significance values for the two covariates were 0.913 for full-time work experience and 0.958 for 
bribe confidence. Removal of these two variables from the model did not affect the model’s R2 or the 
significance of the independent variables. 
 
 
